The captive democracy of SAs coalition governance

By Dr Rekgotsofetse Chikane and Professor David Everatt 

Coalition governance offers potential for enhancing democracy in theory; but the dominance of party-political funding and influence of elite and commercial interests from the minerals-energy-finance sectors risk exacerbating political and economic inequalities in South Africa.

n 2024, South Africa’s young democracy reached a significant milestone. For the first time since the end of apartheid, the African National Congress (ANC), which has held a dominant position in national, provincial and local politics since 1994, failed to secure an outright majority in the national elections, falling short by a notable margin. This outcome reflects a growing shift in public sentiment away from the ANC that began after the 2016 local elections following decades of ANC governance, during which the party—initially celebrated as the liberator of the oppressed and the architect of a democratic South Africa—became enmired in sleaze and corruption.

The ANC’s failure to achieve a majority resulted in the formation of a coalition government, deemed a Government of National Unity (GNU). This coalition comprises ten political parties—substantial and minute—with differing ideologies and priorities, including the Democratic Alliance (DA), a long-time adversary of the ANC. This new political arrangement presents both opportunities and challenges. On the one hand, it could herald a new era of inclusivity and broader representation for various social and political groups that have previously felt marginalized. On the other hand, there is concern that this shift may merely serve to reconfigure existing mechanisms of elite capture, as established political players continue to wield disproportionate influence despite the apparent diversification of government—and despite the voting behaviour of citizens which signified a stark departure from continuously voting for the ANC.

Competing interests 

Like any other coalition, the GNU’s ability to govern effectively will be tested by competing interests and the need for compromise on core policy issues, ranging from economic recovery and job creation to social equity and service delivery. As South Africa navigates this critical juncture, the reality of its political ecosystem—marked by corruption scandals, socioeconomic challenges and growing public disillusionment—will play a crucial role in shaping the future of its democracy. However, what should also be carefully observed over the coming years is whether this new political landscape will lead to genuine reform and revitalization or reinforce existing power dynamics under a different guise—one informed by elite capture in the form of political funding.

Behind the scenes, South Africa’s political economy remains gripped by an entrenched system of extraction and exclusion, upheld by the shadowy influence of the Minerals Energy Financial Complex (MEFC). This nexus of mining, energy and finance elites has dictated the nation’s economic trajectory for decades under apartheid and democracy. While coalition politics may have disrupted single-party dominance, it has also ushered in fresh challenges in creating an equitable society.

At its core, South Africa’s economic system operates on a dual logic: outwardly democratic but inwardly extractive. Inclusive political institutions—characterized by free elections and a progressive bill of rights—have not been matched by inclusive economic systems. Instead, concentrated ownership within the MEFC has ensured that the country’s vast wealth benefits a narrow elite, leaving most South Africans trapped in poverty and unemployment.

The MEFC, whose roots can be found in South Africa’s colonial era, emerged as a survival mechanism for elites during the tail end of the apartheid era, particularly during the regime’s economic crisis in the 1980s. Under pressure from collapsing gold prices, sanctions and disinvestment, apartheid’s architects sought to stabilize the economy by consolidating power within a handful of conglomerates. By the late 1980s, six mining and financial entities controlled 80 per cent of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, namely: the Anglo American Corporation, Sanlam, Stanbic/Liberty Life, Rembrandt/Remgro/Volkskas, SA Mutual/Old Mutual, and Anglovaal. Though apartheid ended, the economic structures it fortified remained largely intact. 

Post-apartheid reforms made strides in creating political inclusion but failed to dismantle the entrenched wealth of mining barons and financiers. Instead, policies like Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) created new beneficiaries without redistributing anything significant to the masses. As a result, wealth inequality in South Africa remains the highest in the world, with a Gini co-efficient of 0.67, a reality that coalition governance now risks perpetuating. 

This article was first published on Republic.com